Just based on my observations of my life, I seem to have the ability to choose to do or not do things, and that's good enough for me. Is my choice just part of the infinite universe's fixed progression through time and I would have done what I did regardless? Are there infinite parallel universes where parallel versions of me exist that have collectively made every choice I can possibly make? Don't care. I feel like I have free will and IMO that's what's most relevant to my life in this universe.
this post was submitted on 20 May 2025
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Tl;Dr, yes*
I find this discussion to be an exercise in frustration. There's a lot of philosophical jargon that gets glazed over and nuances that often get ignored. I also think it's an incredibly complex and complicated topic that we simply do not have enough information available to us to determine in a scientific manner.
For instance: what kind of "free will" are we talking about? Often it's "Libertarian Free Will," that is, absolute agency uninfluenced by any external factors. This much is disproven scientifically, as our brains run countless "subconscious" calculations in response to our environment to hasten decision making and is absolutely influenced by a myriad of factors, regardless of if you're conciously aware of it or not.
However, I think that the above only "disproves" all notions of free will if you divorce your "subconscious" from the rest of your being. Which is where the complication and nuance comes in. What is the "self?" What part of you can you point to as being the "real you?"
From a Christian perspective, you might say the "self" is your soul, which is not yet proven by science, and thus the above has no bearing on, as it cannot take the soul into account. But from the opposite side of the spectrum, from a Buddhist perspective, there is no eternal, unchanging, independently existing "self." And as such, the mind in its entirety, concious awarness or not, is just another part of your aggregates, and from that perspective it can be argued that a decision is no less your own just because it was not made in your conscious awareness.
With my ramblings aside, I am a Buddhist and so my opinion is that we do have free will, we're just not always consciously aware of every decision we make. And while we cannot always directly control every decision we make, we can influence and "train" our autopilot reactions to make better decisions.
There's an element of free will and an element of instinct and mechanism.
Conceptually I see the mind as a system which takes its own outputs as inputs and also reacts to externalities. I also believe in a stochastic universe so there's plenty of opportunities for these partially self-decided decisions to be unique, unpredictable and incorporating the sense of self and an introspected mental model. This is a "good enough for me" version of free will in a physical system.
I have some intuition that the brain probably undergoes some level of "cognitive bootstrapping" where at some point it goes beyond just being a mechanism and starts reacting to stimuli as according to its own learned mental model. But this is necessarily limited and the degree to which an individual gets to do this, as opposed to reacting instinctively or reflexively, varies based on their physical and mental state.
There are also instances where an individual loses their personal sense of freed will and submits it to a crowd, such as in the concept of "de-individuation"
Maybe not 100% because I am the sum of my experiences but I can choose to act against my impulses if I want to.
We have will, it just isn't perfectly free. Our consciousness emerges out of a confluence of intersecting forces, and itself has the ability to influence the flows around it. But to pretend it's removed from those flows and forces, or exists in some vacuum, is nonsensical, as is pretending that there isn't some essence behind the signifier "self".
I believe we do not truly have agency but have evolved to think and act as though we do. Since inputs to each choice are likely infinite (probably uncountable as opposed to countable), the lack of agency is difficult to observe.
I absolutely believe in free will.
I don't think free will can be dismissed just because the framework that it runs on is deterministic.
Let's say you program a text editor. A computer runs the program, but the computer has no influence on what text the user is going to write.
I think that consciousness is a user like that. It runs on deterministic hardware but it's not necessarily deterministic due to that. It might be for other reasons, but the laws of physics isn't it, because physics doesn't prohibit free will from existing.
Consciousness is wildly complex. It's a self illusion and we really have no good idea about where decisions even come from.
If it is deterministic, it would have to involve every single atom in the universe that in one way or another have influenced the person. Wings of a butterfly and light from distant stars etc. Attempting to predict it would require a simulation of everything. That leads to other questions. If a simulation is a 1:1 replica of the real thing, which one is then real and what happens if we run it backwards, can we see what caused the big bang, etc.
So, even if this is about free will, the enquiry falls short on trying to figure out what even causes anything to happen at all.
If we are happy with accepting that the universe was caused by something before or outside the universe, then it's really easy to point in that direction and say that free will also comes from there - somewhere outside the deterministic physics.
Of course the actual universe and the laws of physics are really not separate as data and functions. The data itself contains the instructions. Any system that can contain itself that way is incomplete as proved by Kurt GΓΆdel's incompleteness theorem. Truths do exist that can't be proven so perhaps the concept of free will is an example of such a thing, or maybe it's not. The point is that we can't rule it out, just because it exists in a deterministic system.
Personally I don't think it matters all that much. Similarly to how we can only ever experience things that exists inside of the universe,or see the light that hits our eye, we can also only ever hope to experience free will on the level of our own consciousness, even if we acknowledge that it is influenced by all kinds of other things from all levels from atoms to the big bang.
Yes. Every person has to believe in it to accept the notion of good and evil.
Doesn't matter either way.
I agree. But then I am a pragmatist, which tends to make people extremely mad
Is there a tl;dr for that?
Sure:
It appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
β C. S. Peirce
I don't see why that would make anyone angry, but I also can't understand what the hell it actually means. "The third grade of clearness of apprehension"? "Might conceivably"?
Well, understandable. It's one line out of a book, out of context. What he means is that no metaphysical nonsense actually matters, if it doesn't have real-world consequences. I.e. someone can claim Russell's Teapot actually exists, and rest of us can just ignore them because it's untestable and inconsequential.
This has made very many philosophers very angry, but I don't expect anyone who's not interested in philosophy to care.
Ah I gotcha. That's an actual tl;dr. Makes sense to me and I agree.
No, we don't have free will. HOWEVER, I don't think that arguement will hold up in court.
It can't hold up in court. It ultimately does not matter whether someone is compelled to do evil, or chooses to do evil. Society must be protected in either case
Thereβs a documentary about having free will to create your own fate and determine your own future. Itβs called Terminator 2 Judgment Day.
Anyway, the whole thing goes: The future's not set. There's no fate but what we make for ourselves.
no. events and our decisions are abstracted far enough so that the illusion of free will is apparent. I think it's very well impossible to fully distinguish between free will and fate from our limited perspective
No I don't.
It doesn't matter.
OK let's just start with the assertion that there of a casual link back to the beginning of time.
We will begin with the big one first. We don't even know if time had a beginning.
If we assume that time began at the instant of the big bang. There is no plausible link between my bean induced fart, and some random energy fluctuation, there are just too many chaotic interactions between then and now.
There are so many things we don't know, making the extremely bold claim that free will doesn't exist, is dangerously naive.
We can't even solve Navier-Stokes; neuronal interaction is so far beyond what we are currently capable of, it's ridiculous.
My recommendation to anyone contemplating this question. Assume free will exists; if you are wrong, it will made no difference; you were destined to believe that anyway.
This seems like a very weird way to look at the issue.
For one, not being able to understand minute, uncountable connections and interactions doesn't mean we can't realize a broader relationship of causality between them and our own actions. There are many things we don't know - that's right and undeniable - but there are also many things we do know, or at least that we think we know. Sure, you can go around saying "we understand so little about [virtually any scientific discipline], might as well assume that whatever soothes my psyche is true," but just because the first part of that statement is true doesn't mean the whole thing is reasonable. In my opinion, by the way, it isn't reasonable.
Assume free will exists; if you are wrong, it will made no difference;
Here's a question for you: if you assume free will doesn't exist, what difference does it make? I mean, you still feel like it exists, you live your life as if experiencing it, and regardless of whether you, as an individual, believe it or not, the world continues on as if it does exist. I really see no difference, in practical terms, between believing free will exists or not.
A little off-topic, but this reminds me of those people that say that morality can't exist outside of religion. You say you're an atheist, and then they ask you why you don't go around killing people. Hopefully you understand what I'm talking about here.
It is not really weird, OP is arguing that the universe itself is deterministic. Taking a mechanistic approach to refuting that claim is perfectly valid.
There are a myriad of examples of physical processes that are chaotic, this invalidates OP's claim.
To address the morality point, if God is the source of goodness and morality; beyond the question of "which God?" ; it means objective morality doesn't exist, because God can change it's mind about what is "good".
But that is a discussion finds a different threat.
Free will is real and it's an illusion at the same time.
Our actions are reactions. And we are very limited in our execution of will by the most basic physical boundaries. For example I cannot fly, no matter how much I will it to be so.
We have free will to control the actions of the biological apparatus which is our body, to an extent, though even those are limited by circumstances and consequences.
Overall we have limited free will, or free will "lite"
There's no evidence for free will. Every physical process involved in the function of our bodies and brains has so far proven to be deterministic in every way we can verify. That doesn't mean you can't have an original thought though, it just means that any original thought you have was necessarily going to happen and couldn't possibly have happened any other way. It's fate.
Youβre describing the free will vs predestination debate we had often in theology discussion. Ours never went anywhere, so I wonβt be much help. I just wanted to put a name on it for you. Might help in your search.
I think there may be a paradox hiding in your question. You cannot believe in free will. You have it or you don't - I would postulate you need a neutral third-party observer to tell you. For us humans, a Martian might do. Believing is an act of faith. Faith tends to bend will to its dogmas. I would go so far as to say belief is the natural enemy of a free will.
We are distracted animals. All things being equal, the Martian observer will after years of careful study come to the conclusion that humans have free will. But it's constantly battered by short attention spans, a tendency to go with the herd, presupposituons in our heads that we don't often or never question, etc. We are a smartphone full of bloatware running on too little RAM. It takes skill to operate. Some are more skillful than others.
You could of course counter that by saying that's what you believe. It's paradoxes all the way down.
Thoughts and muscle movements come about through the opening and closing of ion channels that allow information to travel through neurons and for muscle fibers to contract and relax. 'Free will' in the sense that our mind is separate from our body and that it can somehow open those ion channels is a combination of dualism and molecular telekinesis, so I do not believe that, no.
But I do believe that consciousness is an essential emergent property of our brain. What we experience might be the output of a causal prediction engine in our brain that is making a prediction about the immediate sensory experience in a way that we can respond to stimuli before they happen. In that sense, yes, I do believe in free will because that conscious output that I experience is me! This prediction machine is me making predictions and choices.
I think that a materialist framing of free will requires accepting some model of consciousness in which consciousness is not just a weird accident but is a physical phenomenon that is part of us. An essential feature of how our brain works. This is not yet demonstrated (very difficult if not impossible to do so), but I think it is. Then 'free will' and 'a material system following the laws of physics' is no longer a contradiction.
Is the emergent phenomena, consciousness, weak or strong? I think the former, which I think you support, posits a panpsychism and the latter is indistinguishable from magic.
I'm a little confused about the relationship between the causal prediction machine (CPM) and the self. to reiterate, the brain has a causal prediction engine. It's inputs are immediate sensory experience. I assume the causal prediction engines' output is predictions. These predictions are limited to the what the next sensory stimuli might be in response to the recent sensory input. These predictions lead to choices. Or maybe the same as choices.
So these outputs are experienced. And that experience of making predictions is me. Am I the one experiencing the predictions as well?
So this sentence confuses me: "This prediction machine is me making predictions and choices." Am I making the predictions or is it the CPM?
I think that its emergence is weak but I see no resolution to the hard problem of consciousness any time soon, so for the time my opinions about it are ideas that I find compelling and intuitive and not grounded in facts and evidence. Weak emergence does posit some form of pansychism in the sense that sentient-like behavior can emerge in other brains and even that characteristics that we might associate with sentience might emerge from other phenomena present through the universe. But, because of the same reasons that the hard problem is hard, it is also hard to study and learn about these phenomena.
I can try to explain a little better what I meant.
I don't believe we have "free will" in the sense that the mind is separate from the body (dualism) and that it is able to break the laws of physics by altering our physiological processes. I don't think that the non-determinism of quantum mechanics in itself gives us agency, and our mind does not have a mechanism to select how a particular wavev function collapses (not a fan of the Orch OR model).
So, in this traditional sense my answer is "no, we do not have free will"
But I think that the existential crisis and feeling of a lack of agency stems from the model of sentience that one believes. If one rejects dualism, posits that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, but then ascribes only very loosely a mechanism to consciousness such as 'complex information processing gives rise to consciousness', then sentience appears to be just some unexplained quirk that is not essential and just happens to be there. Combining a lack of dualism and free will with consciousness being a useless quirk is what (I think) creates the existential crisis associated with a lack of free will. I used to fall into this camp of thought and resolved the crisis through a logic such as: "Yeah, there is no free will, living is nice though so I am happy that I can accidentally experience the world".
What pushed me to re-assess this way of thinking originally was reading through a paper about teaching a dish of neurons how to play pong](https://www.cell.com/neuron/fulltext/S0896-6273(22)00806-6). At first it did not make sense to me how one can possibly provide feedback to a group of isolated neurons such that it could learn to play a game. What 'reward' can you give a group of neurons to push them to do what you want?!
I looked into Karl Friston, the last author of that paper, which led me down a path of study. I discovered Judea Pearl, who formalized causal reasoning in a way that lets us build statistical models to move from correlations to counterfactual causes. This makes it possible to teach causal inference even to machines.
Karl Friston's work and other researchers in the field argue that the brain is a computer built for causal computing. This idea underpins the Bayesian brain, Predictive Coding Theory, Active Inference.
In Karl Friston's Active Inference book, sentience is proposed to emerge as a result of the prediction engine. What we experience is not actually what our senses already experienced, but instead it is what our brain expects that we will sense in the next instant. This model of reality that is built by our brain in its attempt to perform its basic function (link causes to effects in order to predict the next stimulus).
One idea is that consciousness emerges because the predictive brain is creating a 'model' that does not exist in physical space and so it needs imagination to explore it. The imagination of things that do not exist is essential to the process of generating counterfactuals, and counterfactuals are at the core of the causality machine. To show that A causes B, you need to imagine a situation in which A is not present and estimate the likelyhood of B. One idea is that it is precisely in the creation of a world without A that sentience emerges.
A lot of these ideas are not falsifiable, so it is difficult to say that this is indeed the mechanism of consciousness. But some of the ideas are falsifiable, and those ideas have helped these researchers teach neurons how to play pong, so I think they might have a point.
So, then, I find it plausible that consciousness is not a quirk but an essential feature of our brain. To me this resolves the free will crisis because my consciousness is not an accidental outcome of physical processes just chaotically whizzing by but an actual feature of the machinery that is me.
So these outputs are experienced. And that experience of making predictions is me. Am I the one experiencing the predictions as well?
So this sentence confuses me: βThis prediction machine is me making predictions and choices.β Am I making the predictions or is it the CPM?
I am this machine and I follow the laws of physics. I am part of physical reality, and my sentience is a feature of who I am. If I do something it is because I chose to do so, and the fact that I chose to do so in accordance to the law of physics does not remove my agency.
Yes but I need to define free will, I define it as the freedom to make a choice. We don't control who our parents are, we don't control what country we live in, we don't control how others interact with us but we can control what choices we make.
We can chose option A-B-C.....
"Free will" usually refers to the belief that your decisions cannot be reduced to the laws of physics (e.g. people who say "do you really think your thoughts are just a bunch of chemical reactions in the brain???"), either because they can't be reduced at all or that they operate according to their own independent logic. I see no reason to believe that and no evidence for it.
Some people try to bring up randomness but even if the universe is random that doesn't get you to free will. Imagine if the state forced you to accept a job for life they choose when you turn 18, and they pick it with a random number generator. Is that free will? Of course not. Randomness is not relevant to free will. I think the confusion comes from the fact that we have two parallel debates of "free will vs determinism" and "randomness vs determinism" and people think they're related, but in reality the term "determinism" means something different in both contexts.
In the "free will vs determinism" debate we are talking about nomological determinism, which is the idea that reality is reducible to the laws of physics and nothing more. Even if those laws may be random, it would still be incompatible with the philosophical notion of "free will" because it would still be ultimately the probabilistic mathematical laws that govern the chemical reactions in your brain that cause you to make decisions.
In the "randomness vs determinism" debate we are instead talking about absolute determinism, sometimes also called Laplacian determinism, which is the idea that if you fully know the initial state of the universe you could predict the future with absolute certainty.
These are two separate discussions and shouldn't be confused with one another.
I'm not sold on the whole universe being deterministic, but Robert Sapolsky has a book called Determined which has pretty much convinced me that we don't have any agency. He's a neuroscientist, and breaks down what goes in to our actions based on the immediate causes, our environment, our upbringing, our culture, and, in my opinion, doesn't really leave a place for agency to remain. I don't really understand his arguments well enough to articulate them here, but I think he's done some interviews on YouTube which I'm sure will cover the gist of it.
Of course given physics and materialism, sans metaphysics, free will is s myth. But the calculations are so difficult you may as well believe.
Local causality doesn't imply unbroken universal causality. In fact, the idea everything is a purely deterministic projection of some initial state is far weirder than the idea that stochastic actions can influence a partially deterministic state.
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