World News

On January 1, 2025, Cuba officially sealed its entry as a “partner country” in the BRICS, a bloc that today brings together 46% of the world's population and close to 40% of global GDP. For a nation subjected to six decades of U.S. blockade, this membership symbolizes a strategic window. But what does it really imply?

Partner status - shared with Bolivia, Vietnam and Uganda - grants Cuba participation in discussions, but without full access to financial funds, such as the New Development Bank (NDB) or the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA). According to economic experts, this limits immediate benefits.

However, Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez recognized three concrete advantages, highlighting above all the development of trade in local currencies, which undoubtedly implies a reduction in the dependence on the dollar, crucial to avoid sanctions.

In addition, it is very possible to boost investments in infrastructure, a potential guarantee to modernize deep-water ports as logistics hubs in the Caribbean; and an increase in technological cooperation, derived from access to renewable energy and digitalization projects.

“It is an instance that opens up commercial, investment and cooperation opportunities that we must know how to take advantage of,” he said.

On the other hand, Cuba insists on the potential of our biopharmaceutical industry as a spearhead. Vaccine research and production centers - such as Soberana against COVID - could be valuable assets. However, a report by the Center for International Policy Research admits that the sector faces scale and commercialization challenges. Meanwhile, external economists are skeptical: “When will we stop depending on organizations to channel the economy?”, asks a user on the Cubadebate website.

The key would be in integrated value chains, and in the association with India in generic production, or with China in mass distribution. But without investments to modernize plants, the biotechnology “advantage” could remain rhetoric.

Trade in domestic currencies is the biggest practical attraction for Cuba. The BCBPI (Cross Border Payments Initiative) mechanism would allow direct transactions in yuan, rubles or reals, bypassing the dollar and its sanctions. Among some of the possibilities, the sale of nickel to China in yuan and the import of Russian wheat in rubles are very possible and applicable.

But here a dilemma arises: although it reduces financial vulnerabilities, it does not solve Cuba's low productivity. Without attractive exportable goods, the scheme would be sustained on loans or aid, repeating old patterns of dependence.

Moreover, realistically in light of recent global developments, the BRICS bloc is far from being monolithic. While Russia and China see it as an anti-hegemonic tool, Brazil and India prioritize neutrality and pragmatism. Cuba, historically aligned with Moscow and Beijing, must now navigate divided waters.

Waters that can be exploited and result in South-South mediation opportunities, where there are capacities to export public health models to Africa and Asia, using Brazilian networks; and to promote energy dialogue that facilitates debates between Venezuela -vetoed by Brazil- and Brasilia, taking advantage of its credibility on both sides.

But if there is something important about Cuba's inclusion in the BRICS, it is the geographical position of our country -the key to the Gulf-, which can facilitate the group's access to Latin American markets.

The BRICS offer Cuba geopolitical oxygen and tools to circumvent the blockade. But the status of partner is only a first step on a road full of opportunities and challenges, where opportunities such as port logistics, alternative finances and technological alliances stand out.

Cuba must avoid the extreme of uncritical euphoria -as if BRICS were a magic lifeline- knowing that the real test will be whether we manage to turn this membership into measurable investments, food into tables and watts into plugs.